Building Systems That Do Not Fail

Fourth and final in a series examining the IndiGo operational crisis of December 2025

From Critique to Construction

Three parts of this series examined what went wrong.

Part 1 documented the crisis. Over 4,500 flights cancelled. Twenty-two months of warning ignored. A regulatory deadline treated as a surprise.

Part 2 examined the governance. A Risk Management Committee with world-class credentials. A BRSR that listed 19 material risks but omitted the one that mattered most.

Part 3 asked who was watching the watchdogs. A regulator at 50% capacity. A ministry that verified nothing before implementation. A securities watchdog whose surveillance systems can catch penny stock manipulation but not a missing material risk.

Now comes the harder question. What should have been done differently? What does operational resilience actually look like?

This is not about armchair critique. It is about frameworks that prevent collapse before it happens.

The Accountability Cascade

Before turning to solutions, consider what has unfolded since the crisis peaked.

The DGCA has terminated four Flight Operations Inspectors who were responsible for overseeing IndiGo’s operations: Rish Raj Chatterjee, Seema Jhamnani, Anil Kumar Pokhariyal and Priyam Kaushik. [DD News] These officials were tasked with inspecting, auditing, and certifying airline operations. Their removal raises uncomfortable questions about the oversight that was supposed to prevent exactly this kind of failure.

IndiGo’s Board has appointed Aviation Advisors LLC, led by Captain Illson with over four decades of aviation experience across the FAA, ICAO, IATA and major global carriers, to conduct an independent root-cause analysis of the disruptions. [Telangana Today] Chairman Vikram Singh Mehta acknowledged that the airline “let passengers down” and promised the board would “examine every aspect of what went wrong.” [Business Standard]

The Parliamentary Standing Committee on Transport, Tourism and Culture is likely to summon airline executives, DGCA officials, and Ministry of Civil Aviation representatives. [Business Standard] CPI(M) MP John Brittas has demanded a joint parliamentary committee or judicial inquiry into the disruptions.

The Competition Commission of India has initiated a suo motu examination of whether IndiGo’s dominant position, at over 65% market share, played any role in how the crisis unfolded. [Business Today]

Moody’s has downgraded IndiGo’s human capital issuer score to 4 from 3, terming the disruptions “credit negative” and citing “significant lapses in planning, oversight and resource management.” [Business Standard] Jefferies has removed IndiGo from its India model portfolio for 2026.

The financial damage is substantial. IndiGo has estimated compensation payouts exceeding Rs 500 crore for affected passengers. [Business Standard] Rs 53,000 crore has been wiped from the airline’s market capitalisation. [CNBC] Revenue loss is estimated at Rs 1,800 crore and counting.

Hotel chains are reporting 10-15% drops in December bookings as a direct consequence of the flight disruptions. [Business Standard]

As of December 14, IndiGo claims operations have stabilised, with five consecutive days of normal performance and over 2,050 flights operating daily across all 138 destinations. [Tribune India] On-time performance has recovered to 91% across the network. [Skift]

This cascade of accountability, inquiry, and financial consequence is necessary. But it is reactive. The question this article addresses is simple: what systems should have been in place to prevent the crisis from occurring at all?

A Principle from Military Logistics

In military operations, there is a doctrine that governs how forces are sustained in the field. It is called the “maintenance of the aim with flexibility in execution.”

The aim is non-negotiable. The mission must be accomplished. But the path to accomplishment must account for friction, uncertainty, and the inevitable gap between plans and reality.

Clausewitz called it “the fog of war.” In corporate terms, we might call it operational risk. The principle remains the same. No plan survives first contact with execution unchanged.

Military logistics doctrine addresses this through three core principles that translate directly to corporate operations:

Redundancy. Never depend on a single point of failure.

Buffer capacity. Maintain reserves that can absorb unexpected demand.

Early warning. Detect problems before they become crises.

Each of these was absent in the IndiGo situation. Each could have prevented the collapse.

Redundancy: The Principle IndiGo Violated

In military logistics, redundancy is not inefficiency. It is survival.

A convoy does not carry exactly the fuel it needs. It carries more. A field hospital does not stock precisely the medical supplies projected for a campaign. It stocks extra. A communications system does not rely on a single channel. It maintains backups.

The reason is simple. Projections are always wrong. Demand is always uncertain. And when the system fails, there is no second chance.

IndiGo’s crew planning operated on the opposite principle.

The airline needed 2,422 captains to comply with FDTL Phase 2. It had 2,357. A gap of 65 pilots, roughly 2.7% short.

In a redundancy-based model, this gap would have been identified as unacceptable months before implementation. Hiring would have commenced with a buffer. The target would not have been 2,422. It would have been 2,600 or 2,700, accounting for attrition, sick leave, training requirements, and the inevitable variance between plans and reality.

Instead, the airline operated on a “lean manpower strategy” that assumed every pilot would be available exactly when needed, every roster would execute as planned, and no margin was required for error.

A senior IndiGo official admitted as much: “Our pilot numbers are fine, while we may not have the luxury of having a buffer.” [News Today]

This is not efficiency. It is fragility disguised as optimisation.

The Federation of Indian Pilots identified this precisely. They pointed to “years of lean manpower planning” and delayed hiring, non-poaching arrangements and other “short-sighted planning practices” as the root of the crisis. [Al Jazeera]

Moody’s was equally direct. IndiGo’s “lean operating model lacked resilience to integrate the change, forcing a system-wide schedule reset.” [Business Standard]

Lean works when everything goes according to plan. Redundancy works when it does not.

Buffer Capacity: The Reserve That Wasn’t There

Military operations maintain what is called “operational reserve.” Forces held back, not committed to the immediate fight, available to exploit success or recover from setback.

The principle applies directly to workforce planning.

When FDTL Phase 2 reduced the number of night landings per pilot from six to two per week, IndiGo’s existing roster became insufficient. The airline had no buffer to absorb the change.

Consider the contrast with other airlines.

Akasa Air focused on recruiting new pilots well in advance of FDTL implementation. [Al Jazeera] The airline built buffer capacity before the regulation took effect.

Air India boosted flight crew for domestic flights, creating the slack needed to absorb new duty limitations without operational disruption.

These airlines did not have superior intelligence about FDTL. They had the same 22-month warning. What they had was a different philosophy: build reserves before you need them, not after.

IndiGo’s recruitment drive began on November 5, 2025, four days after FDTL Phase 2 went live. [Business Standard] This is not planning. This is a reaction.

In military terms, this is the equivalent of ordering ammunition after the battle has begun. It may eventually arrive. But the position has already been lost.

Early Warning: Detecting Problems Before They Become Crises

Every military headquarters maintains an intelligence function. Its purpose is not merely to track the enemy. It is to anticipate. To detect emerging threats before they materialise into attacks.

The corporate equivalent is risk surveillance. Continuous monitoring of indicators that signal potential operational failure.

IndiGo had all the data it needed to detect the coming crisis.

It knew its pilot count. It knew the FDTL requirements. It could calculate the gap. It had 22 months to observe the trajectory of hiring versus requirement.

The arithmetic was not complex. If you need 2,422 captains by November 1 and you have 2,357 in late October, you have a problem. If your hiring began four days after the deadline, you knew you had a problem and chose not to solve it in time.

The question is not whether the data existed. The question is whether anyone was watching it with the authority to act.

This is where governance intersects with operations.

A Risk Management Committee that meets quarterly cannot provide early warning for a crisis developing weekly. A BRSR filed annually cannot capture risks materialising monthly. A regulator conducting scheduled audits cannot detect compliance gaps emerging between inspections.

The termination of four DGCA Flight Operations Inspectors underscores this point. [Tribune India] These were the officials tasked with oversight. Questions are now being raised about whether the DGCA adequately assessed IndiGo’s pilot strength before approving a 10% increase in flights in the winter schedule.

Early warning requires three things.

Real-time visibility. Dashboards that show crew availability versus requirement, updated daily, not quarterly.

Defined thresholds. Automatic escalation when buffer capacity falls below acceptable levels.

Authority to act. Someone with the power to halt schedule expansion when crew availability cannot support it.

None of these appear to have been in place at IndiGo. The crisis was not detected. It was discovered by passengers at airports in December.

Command Responsibility: The Doctrine That Should Apply

In military service, there is a principle called “command responsibility.”

A commanding officer is responsible for everything the unit does or fails to do. Not because the commander personally performs every task. But the commander is accountable for ensuring the systems are in place to accomplish the mission.

If a unit fails to maintain its equipment and vehicles break down during an operation, the commander is responsible. Not because the commander personally neglected the maintenance. But because the commander failed to ensure maintenance was being performed.

If intelligence is available but not acted upon, the commander is responsible. Not because the commander personally ignored the intelligence. But because the commander failed to create systems that ensured intelligence reached decision-makers.

This principle does not seek scapegoats. It establishes accountability.

Applied to corporate governance, command responsibility means the following.

The CEO is responsible for ensuring crew planning systems are adequate, even if the CEO did not personally manage rosters.

The Board is responsible for ensuring risk oversight captures material operational risks, even if the Board did not personally review FDTL compliance.

The Risk Management Committee is responsible for ensuring early warning systems exist, even if the Committee did not personally monitor pilot availability.

IndiGo’s Crisis Management Group was formed on December 7, 2025, after the crisis had erupted. The Board held an “emergency meeting on the first day of disruptions.” [Business Standard]

This is not crisis management. This is a crisis acknowledgement.

A crisis management capability should exist before the crisis. Its purpose is prevention, not reaction.

What Operational Resilience Actually Looks Like

Let me be specific about what IndiGo, or any organisation facing similar regulatory transitions, should have built.

1. A Compliance Countdown Dashboard

From January 2024, when FDTL was notified, a visible tracker should have shown: days to Phase 1 implementation, days to Phase 2 implementation, current crew count versus required crew count, gap trajectory (improving, stable, deteriorating), and hiring pipeline status. This dashboard should have been reviewed weekly by operations leadership and monthly by the Board.

2. A Buffer Policy

A formal policy establishing a minimum crew buffer above the regulatory requirement. Not 2,422 pilots for a 2,422 requirement. Perhaps 2,650 pilots, a 10% buffer accounting for leave, attrition, training, and variance. When the buffer falls below threshold, automatic triggers: hiring acceleration, schedule review, executive escalation.

3. Scenario Planning

Before committing to a winter schedule, test it against scenarios. What if 5% of pilots take unexpected leave? What if attrition exceeds forecast? What if the regulator enforces strictly with no exemptions? The DGCA approved IndiGo’s winter schedule of 15,014 weekly departures, a 6% increase from summer. [Skift] Neither the regulator nor the airline appears to have stress-tested this schedule against realistic crew availability scenarios.

4. A Pre-Implementation Audit

Sixty days before November 1, an internal audit should have asked: Are we ready? Can we operate the committed schedule with the available crew under FDTL Phase 2? If the answer is no, reduce the schedule before selling tickets, not after cancelling flights.

5. Regulator Engagement

Proactive communication with DGCA: “Here is our readiness status. Here are our gaps. Here is our mitigation plan.” This is not a weakness. This is a partnership in compliance. Regulators prefer airlines that self-identify problems over airlines that discover problems through passenger chaos.

What the Oversight Ecosystem Should Build

IndiGo’s failures were its own. But the oversight ecosystem also needs strengthening.

For DGCA:

Pre-implementation readiness audits should become standard for major regulatory changes. Before FDTL Phase 2 went live, each airline should have demonstrated compliance capability. Schedules should not have been approved without verification.

Risk-based surveillance should replace calendar-based audits. Airlines with thin crew buffers should receive more scrutiny, not less.

Staffing must match the mandate. A regulator at 50% capacity cannot effectively oversee a sector carrying 376 million passengers. The termination of four Flight Operations Inspectors is a start. But individual accountability must be paired with systemic reform.

For SEBI:

Cross-reference mechanisms should link sectoral regulatory announcements to corporate risk disclosures. When DGCA issues a major regulation, listed airlines should be queried on materiality assessment.

Materiality cannot remain purely self-assessed. Exchanges should have the authority to question obvious omissions.

For MOCA:

Implementation verification should precede regulatory deadlines. The Ministry authored FDTL. The Ministry should have verified readiness before enforcement.

Civil Aviation Minister Ram Mohan Naidu has stated that “no airline, no matter how big, will be allowed to cause hardship to passengers.” [CNBC] This principle must be backed by pre-emptive systems, not just post-crisis enforcement.

The Broader Lesson: Resilience is Not Efficiency

There is a tendency in modern business to equate efficiency with excellence. Lean operations. Just-in-time inventory. Minimal buffer. Maximum utilisation.

This works beautifully when everything goes according to plan.

It fails catastrophically when it does not.

The IndiGo crisis is a case study in the cost of fragility. An airline optimised for efficiency, with no margin for error, encountered a regulatory change that required ma argin.

Resilience is different from efficiency. Resilience accepts that plans will fail, systems will stress, and demand will vary. Resilience builds in the capacity to absorb shocks without collapse.

In military logistics, we call this “sustainability.” The ability to maintain operations over time, through friction, through setback, through the unexpected.

IndiGo was efficient. It was not sustainable. And 4,500 cancelled flights, tens of thousands of stranded passengers, Rs 53,000 crore in lost market value, and a reputational crisis later, the cost of that choice is clear.

Where Zentra Consulting Fits

This is precisely the domain where Zentra Consulting operates.

Our practice brings military logistics doctrine to corporate operations. We help organisations build the systems that prevent crises rather than respond to them.

Operational Resilience Assessment: We evaluate your critical processes for single points of failure, inadequate buffer capacity, and missing early warning systems before they manifest as crises.

Compliance Countdown Frameworks: For organisations facing major regulatory transitions, we build the dashboards, thresholds, and escalation protocols that ensure readiness well before deadlines.

Scenario-Based Stress Testing: We subject your operational plans to realistic adverse scenarios and identify where they break before the market does.

Risk Governance Enhancement: We strengthen the connection between your Risk Management Committee, your operational data, and your decision-making processes.

The IndiGo crisis was preventable. The tools and techniques are not complex. They are foundational. What was missing was the discipline to apply them.

A Final Reflection

On December 5, at the peak of the crisis, on-time performance was just 3.7% across the six major Indian metros. [Skift] As many as 1,600 flights were cancelled in a single day. [The Better India]

IndiGo has announced Rs 10,000 travel vouchers for passengers severely affected on December 3, 4 and 5, in addition to statutory compensation of Rs 5,000 to Rs 10,000. [Business Today] Total compensation is estimated to exceed Rs 500 crore. The airline has processed refunds for over 586,000 cancelled bookings. [Skift]

These are necessary steps. But they are rearguard actions, addressing consequences rather than causes.

The real question is what happens next.

Will IndiGo build genuine operational resilience, with buffer capacity, early warning systems, and scenario-tested schedules? Or will it return to lean optimisation once the immediate pressure subsides?

Will the oversight ecosystem strengthen its pre-implementation verification, risk-based surveillance, and cross-regulatory coordination? Or will it revert to calendar-based audits and reactive enforcement?

Will the lessons of December 2025 be institutionalised? Or will they be forgotten until the next crisis?

Conclusion: Governance is Prevention, Not Response

Four parts of this series have examined a single question from multiple angles. How did India’s largest airline, with 22 months of warning, cancel 4,500 flights in December 2025?

The answers are uncomfortable.

Corporate governance that listed 19 risks but missed the one that mattered. An oversight ecosystem that verified nothing before implementation. A business model that optimised for efficiency at the cost of resilience. And a regulatory response that granted exemptions rather than ensuring compliance.

But discomfort is not the purpose. Learning is.

The IndiGo crisis offers a template for what not to do. More importantly, it offers a framework for what must be done differently.

Build redundancy. Maintain buffer. Detect early. Establish accountability. Verify before deadlines, not after failures.

These are not complex principles. They are foundational. And their absence cost tens of thousands of passengers their travel plans, their weddings, their family gatherings, and their faith in the system.

376 million passengers fly through Indian airports each year. They deserve an aviation ecosystem that builds systems which do not fail.

Not because failure is impossible. But because resilience is designed.